A Etnomatemática, segundo Ubiratan D’Ambrosio, constitui uma subárea da História da Matemática e da Educação Matemática politicamente engajada, voltada para transformação social e para a recuperação da dignidade cultural dos indivíduos. Entretanto, em um dos momentos mais críticos para o povo brasileiro, em plena crise sanitária e econômica da pandemia de Covid-19, por uma infeliz coincidência, atravessamos uma ampla reforma curricular impulsionada publicação da “Base Nacional Comum Curricular – BNCC”, em 2018, documento norteador dos currículos nacionais que ignorou a História (...) da Matemática, bem como nossa grande tradição em pesquisa e ensino etnomatemáticos. Por outro lado, os documentos curriculares complementares publicados em 2019: “Referenciais Curriculares para a Elaboração de Itinerários Formativos” e “Temas Contemporâneos Transversais na BNCC: Contexto Histórico e Pressupostos Pedagógicos” colocaram os professores brasileiros diante de um vazio fértil, repleto de desafios e possibilidades. Discutir esse cenário educacional é o objetivo central deste artigo. Trata-se de uma pesquisa qualitativa, de cunho bibliográfico e documental, que se debruça sobre documentos curriculares brasileiros e pesquisas embasadas na Etnomatemática, para tentar responder à nossa questão de pesquisa “Quais os principais desafios e possibilidades para a promoção da Etnomatemática na Educação Básica brasileira, no contexto da atual reforma curricular, em uma perspectiva interdisciplinar e transdisciplinar?”. Nosso foco é a rede estadual de ensino de São Paulo, por se tratar da maior rede de ensino do Brasil e por ser uma das primeiras e elaborar um currículo pautado pela BNCC, além de um projeto próprio para a exploração dos temas curriculares transversais, implantação e implementação do Novo Ensino Médio. Nossos resultados mostram que, apesar do engessamento curricular promovido pela BNCC, ainda existe margem para desenvolvimento de propostas educacionais que contemplem as necessidades locais, que respeite as diferenças regionais e as peculiaridades da cultura escolar, em uma perspectiva etnomatemática. (shrink)

Com a análise conceitual da arte e da expressão artística, este artigo situa a discussão do ensino de arte em síntese aos pressupostos críticos de Walter Benjamin. Busca-se, primeiramente, o sentido da arte no contexto de seu surgimento, sua valorização cultural e sua função social, para, posteriormente, mediante pressupostos da Teoria Crítica da Sociedade, verificar-se as contradições com sua desintegração na atualidade, apropriada pela indústria cultural como valor de mercadoria. Nesse trajeto, a reprodução técnica da obra de arte tornase o (...) fundamento categórico para a crítica e o desnudamento das formas decadentes sob as quais a arte é “visualizada” na modernidade. A redução das formas estéticas de percepção da arte expressa-se no desaparecimento da experiência, na incapacidade de narrar, na crise da transmissão, enfim, no ensino de arte. (shrink)

Philosophy of science has undergone a naturalistic turn, moving away from traditional idealized concerns with the logical structure of scientific theories and toward focusing on real-world scientific practice, especially in domains such as modeling and experimentation. As part of this shift, recent work has explored how the project of philosophically understanding science as a natural phenomenon can be enriched by drawing from different fields and disciplines, including niche construction theory in evolutionary biology, on the one hand, and ecological and enactive (...) views in embodied cognitive science, on the other. But these insights have so far been explored in separation from each other, without clear indication of whether they can work together. Moreover, the focus on particular practices, however insightful, has tended to lack consideration of potential further implications for a naturalized understanding of science as a whole (i.e., above and beyond those particular practices). Motivated by these developments, here we sketch a broad-ranging view of science, scientific practice and scientific knowledge in terms of ecological-enactive co-construction. The view we propose situates science in the biological, evolutionary context of human embodied cognitive activity aimed at addressing the demands of life. This motivates reframing theory as practice, and reconceptualizing scientific knowledge in ecological terms, as relational and world-involving. Our view also brings to the forefront of attention the fundamental link between ideas about the nature of mind, of science and of nature itself, which we explore by outlining how our proposal differs from more conservative, and narrower, conceptions of “cognitive niche construction.”. (shrink)

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

Visiones antropológicas divergentes en artículos científicos de bioética en Brasil Divergent Anthropological Views in Scientific Articles on Bioethics in Brazil The aim of the study is to characterize Brazilian bioethics outputs anthropologically, specifically scientific articles. The guiding question of this research is: What is the anthropological characterization present in scientific articles on bioethics in Brazil? Prominent bioethical theories show restrictive anthropology indicators; i.e., dignity is given only to members of the human species that have certain attributes, including conscience and self-consciousness, (...) as opposed to comprehensive anthropology indicators in relation to human beings; i.e., dignity is equally assigned to all members of the Homo sapiens species. In conclusion, comprehensive anthropology indicators and theoretical divergence in relation to the origin of life, especially between utilitarianism and personalism, prevail. Para citar este artículo / To reference this article / Para citar este artigo Sanches MA, Monteiro TM. Visões antropológicas divergentes em artigos científicos de bioética no Brasil. Pers Bioet. 2019; 23: 64-83. DOI: https://doi.org/10.5294/pebi.2019.23.1.5 Recibido: 09/10/2018 Aceptado: 20/03/2019. (shrink)

Explanatory diversity is a salient feature of the sciences of the mind, where different projects focus on neural, psychological, cognitive, social or other explanations. The same happens within embodied cognitive science, where ecological, enactive, dynamical, phenomenological and other approaches differ from each other in their explanations of the embodied mind. As traditionally conceived, explanatory diversity is philosophically problematic, fueling debates about whether the different explanations are competing, compatible, or tangential. In contrast, this paper takes the perspective of embodied cognitive science (...) as its starting point and accordingly approaches explanatory diversity not as a problem to be solved, but as a phenomenon to be understood. Recent work has explored how the view of cognition as embodied motivates reflexively viewing science as a situated embodied cognitive practice. Here I argue that this reflexive turn motivates adopting a pluralistic stance when it comes to questions about theoretical and methodological disagreements. In particular, it motivates moving away from thinking in terms of explanations as disembodied entities that compete with one another, and instead thinking in terms of different explanatory styles as embodied practices of explaining, many of which might be legitimate and warranted independently of whether and how the explanations themselves relate to one another. (shrink)

Psychology has a WEIRD problem. It is overly reliant on participants from Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic societies. Over the last decade this problem has come to be widely acknowledged, yet there has been little progress toward making psychology more diverse. This Element proposes that the lack of progress can be explained by the fact that the original WEIRD critique was too narrow in scope. Rather than a single problem of a lack of diversity among research participants, there are (...) at least four overlapping problems. Psychology is WEIRD not only in terms of who makes up its participant pool, but also in terms of its theoretical commitments, methodological assumptions, and institutional structures. Psychology as currently constituted is a fundamentally WEIRD enterprise. Coming to terms with this is necessary if we wish to make psychology relevant for all humanity. (shrink)

Resenha do livro The Ethics of Environmentally Responsible Health Care.

A popular trend in the sciences of the mind is to understand cognition as embodied, embedded, enactive, ecological, and so on. While some of the work under the label of “embodied cognition” takes for granted key commitments of traditional cognitive science, other projects coincide in treating embodiment as the starting point for an entirely different way of investigating all of cognition. Focusing on the latter, this paper discusses how embodied cognitive science can be made more reflexive and more sensitive to (...) the implications that our views of cognition have for how we understand scientific practice, including our own theorizing about cognition. Inspired by the “strong programme” in the sociology of scientific knowledge, I explore the prospect of an analogously “strong” program in embodied cognitive science. I first draw from Dewey’s transactional notion of “situation” to identify a broad sense in which embodied cognitive science takes cognition, as an embodied phenomenon, to be _situated_. I then sketch a perspective I call _situated reflexivity_, which extends the Deweyan analysis to understand scientific practice in the same terms, and thereby illustrates what research in line with a strong program in embodied cognitive science can look like. This move, I propose, has the potential of setting up a new inquiry situation that makes more salient the embodiment of scientific practice and that, through this, can help organize our own embodied cognitive activities as we try to make sense of scientific work, including our own. (shrink)

In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

This study aims to examine the ethical decision-making model proposed by Schwartz, where we consider the factors of non-rationality and aspects that affect ethical judgments of auditors to make the decision to blow the whistle. In this paper, we argue that the intention of whistleblowing depends on ethical awareness and ethical judgment as well as there is a mediation–moderation due to emotion and perceived moral intensity of auditors. Data were collected using an online survey with 162 external auditors who worked (...) on audit firms in Indonesia as well as 173 internal auditors working in the manufacturing and financial services. The result of multigroup analysis shows that emotion can mediate the relationship between EAW and EJW. The nature of this relationship is more complex and then tested by adding moderating variables using consistent partial least squares approach. We found that EMT and PMI can improve the relationship between ethical judgments and whistleblowing intentions. These findings indicate that internal auditors are more likely to blow the whistle than external auditors; and reporting wrongdoing internally and anonymously are the preferred way of professional accountants to blow the whistle in Indonesia. (shrink)

An intuitive view is that creativity involves bringing together what is already known and familiar in a way that produces something new. In cognitive science, this intuition is typically formalized in terms of computational processes that combine or associate internally represented information. From this computationalist perspective, it is hard to imagine how non-representational approaches in embodied cognitive science could shed light on creativity, especially when it comes to abstract conceptual reasoning of the kind scientists so often engage in. The present (...) article offers an entry point to addressing this challenge. The scientific project of embodied cognitive science is a continuation of work in the functionalist tradition in psychology developed over a century ago by William James and John Dewey, among others. The focus here is on how functionalist views on the nature of mind, thought, and experience offer an alternative starting point for cognitive science in general, and for the cognitive science of scientific creativity in particular. The result may seem paradoxical. On the one hand, the article claims that the functionalist conceptual framework motivates rejecting mainstream cognitive views of creativity as the combination or association of ideas. On the other hand, however, the strategy adopted here—namely, revisiting ideas from functionalist psychology to inform current scientific theorizing—can itself be described as a process of arriving at new, creative ideas from combinations of old ones. As is shown here, a proper understanding of cognition in light of the functionalist tradition resolves the seeming tension between these two claims. (shrink)

This paper aims at shedding light on an obscure point in Kant's theory of the state. It discusses whether Kant's rational theory of the state recognises the fact that certain exceptional social situations, such as the extreme poverty of some parts of the population, could request institutional state support in order to guarantee the attainment of a minimum threshold of civil independence. It has three aims: 1) to show that Kant's Doctrine of Right can offer solutions for the complex relation (...) between economics and politics in our present time; 2) to demonstrate the claim that Kant embraces a pragmatic standpoint when he tackles the social concerns of the state, and so to refute the idea that he argues for an abstract conception of politics; and 3) to suggest that a non-paternalistic theory of rights is not necessarily incompatible with the basic tenets of a welfare state. O presente artigo tenciona contribuir a esclarecer uma questão, tão complicada quanto polêmica, no âmbito da teoria kantiana do Estado de direito. Pretendo submeter à discussão se a teoria racional de Kant sobre o Estado legal sustenta ou rejeita o fato de que certas situações sociais excepcionais, como a extrema pobreza de uma parte da população, requerem o apoio institucional do Estado para garantir a consecução de um limiar mínimo de independência civil. Proponho-me os três seguintes objetivos: 1) argumentar a capacidade da doutrina kantiana do direito para propor soluções para a difícil relação entre economia e política, no tempo presente; 2) mostrar que o ponto de vista pragmático que Kant adota quando analisa as preocupações sociais do Estado recusa a ideia segundo a qual Kant sustenta uma concepção abstrata da política e 3) sugerir a tese de uma teoria não paternalista do Estado de direito sem ter que renunciar necessariamente aos princípios básicos do welfare state. (shrink)

Debate about cognitive science explanations has been formulated in terms of identifying the proper level(s) of explanation. Views range from reductionist, favoring only neuroscience explanations, to mechanist, favoring the integration of multiple levels, to pluralist, favoring the preservation of even the most general, high-level explanations, such as those provided by embodied or dynamical approaches. In this paper, we challenge this framing. We suggest that these are not different levels of explanation at all but, rather, different styles of explanation that capture (...) different, cross-cutting patterns in cognitive phenomena. Which pattern is explanatory depends on both the cognitive phenomenon under investigation and the research interests occasioning the explanation. This reframing changes how we should answer the basic questions of which cognitive science approaches explain and how these explanations relate to one another. On this view, we should expect different approaches to offer independent explanations in terms of their different focal patterns and the value of those explanations to partly derive from the broad patterns they feature. (shrink)

According to Deleuze and Guattari ([1972] 2009), the Oedipus complex is a historically produced social symptom that captures desire in neurotic and familial, capitalist, and Christian forms. From this perspective, narcissism is not a primordial condition, which precedes the Oedipus complex phase, but is its consequence and effect, reversing the logic of human development postulated by Psychoanalysis. The aim here is to carry on with Deleuze and Guattari’s criticisms of Psychoanalysis, approaching narcissism as a phenomenon manufactured by this same civilization (...) that aims to combat it. If in Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari demonstrate that the Oedipus complex is not a natural and universal path to the formations of the unconscious, but is produced by the civilized capitalist machine, Narcissus is now placed in the spotlight, unfolding the narratives of psychoanalytic theory about a supposed anti-social human nature. (shrink)

The capacity to attribute beliefs to others in order to understand action is one of the mainstays of human cognition. Yet it is debatable whether children attribute beliefs in the same way to all agents. In this paper, we present the results of a false-belief task concerning humans and God run with a sample of Maya children aged 4–7, and place them in the context of several psychological theories of cognitive development. Children were found to attribute beliefs in different ways (...) to humans and God. The evidence also speaks to the debate concerning the universality and uniformity of the development of folk-psychological reasoning. (shrink)

On the face of it, the perspective that Casper puts forward in his paper (Chap. 2) and the one I offer in mine (Chap. 4)are completely at odds with each other. He sees the current diversity of explanations, theories and methods in embodied cognitive science as problematic and calling for some kind of integration, whereas I defend an extreme pluralist stance and don’t see the diversity as a problem. Not only that, but while he argues for coordination between the disparate (...) approaches, I propose that expecting such coordination is in many cases unrealistic and moreover that, even when it’s possible, it might be counterproductive. The straightforward thing to do now would be for me to double down and use this space to try to show why I’m right and Casper is wrong. But I don’t think he’s wrong. He and I do disagree, but I don’t think it’s that sort of disagreement where only one side can be right and the other must be wrong. In particular, I don’t think that focusing on the different conclusions he and I draw in our respective chapters is a fruitful way to understand the nature of our disagreement. My goal in this commentary will be to explain why. I don’t know if Casper will agree with my assessment or not, but I won’t be surprised if he doesn’t—in fact, as I will suggest, this would make perfect sense given what I propose in my chapter. Still, my hope is that, by clarifying how (from my perspective) our different views relate to each other, I can help some readers better appreciate both his proposal and mine. (shrink)

Resumo: Este estudo analisa as narrativas radiofônicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma e conteúdo através do qual o autor buscou proporcionar para a infância de seu tempo uma possibilidade de experiência com o contemporâneo. Ao se pensar as peças do ponto de vista didático e do ponto de vista da aprendizagem, pode-se encontrar nelas a intencionalidade de Benjamin, bem como a atenção e o cuidado dado por ele a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para o esclarecimento como Aufklärung, no cotidiano prosaico das (...) massas. Esse cuidado o levou a questionar, a exercitar e a experimentar a transmissão do conhecimento por meios novos e metodologias inovadoras para a época, sem perder de vista a perspectiva dos vencidos, em sua batalha diária, ou seja, em seu cotidiano. As peças, portanto, não são modelos apenas em sua estrutura narrativa, mas também de uma intencionalidade pedagógica emancipadora que pode dialogar com a criança, mediante a ludo-linguagem de domínio e fluência das crianças. A infância, nesse sentido, é signo de uma nova subjetividade fortalecida e, assim, capaz de resistir e de se desviar dos encantos e das promessas do populismo fascista que, no século XXI, não deixou de rondar a todos. Palavras-chave: Narrativas Radiofônicas; Experiência; Walter Benjamin Radiophone tales: the emergency of a modern form of narration in Benjamin Abstract: This study analyzes Walter Benjamin's radio narratives as a form and content through which the author sought to provide the childhood of his time with a possibility of experiencing the contemporary. Whenever thinking about the pieces from the didactic point of view and from the learning point of view, it could find Benjamin's intentionality among it, as well as the attention and care given by him to elements apparently irrelevant to the clarification, such as Aufklärung, in the prosaic daily life of masses. This care led him to question, exercise and experiment with the transmission of knowledge through new means and innovative methodologies for the time, without losing sight of the perspective of the losers, in their daily battle, that is, in their daily lives. The plays, therefore, are not models only in their narrative structure, but also of an emancipatory pedagogical intentionality that can dialogue with the child, through the ludo-language of mastery and fluency of children. Childhood, in this sense, is a sign of a new, strengthened subjectivity and, consequently, capable of resisting and deviating from the charms and promises of fascist populism that, in the 21st century, did not cease to haunt everyone. Keywords: Radio Narratives; Experience; Walter Benjamin Cuentos radiofónicos: la emergencia de una forma moderna de narración en Benjamin Resumén: Este estudio analiza las narrativas radiofónicas de Walter Benjamin, como forma y contenido a través del cual el autor buscó proporcionar para la infancia de su tiempo una posibilidad de experiencia con lo contemporáneo. Al pensar en las piezas, desde el punto de vista didáctico y desde el punto de vista del aprendizaje, se puede encontrar en ellas la intencionalidad de Benjamin, así como la atención y el cuidado dado por él a elementos aparentemente irrelevantes para el esclarecimiento como Aufklärung, en el prosaico diario de las masas. Ese cuidado lo llevó a cuestionar, a ejercitar y a experimentar la transmisión del conocimiento por medios nuevos y metodologías innovadoras para la época, sin perder de vista la perspectiva de los vencidos, en su batalla diaria, o sea, en su cotidiano. Las piezas, por lo tanto, no son modelos solo en su estructura narrativa, sino también de una intencionalidad pedagógica emancipadora que puede dialogar con el niño, mediante el Ludo lenguaje de dominio y fluidez de los niños. La infancia, en ese sentido, es signo de una nueva subjetividad fortalecida y, así, capaz de resistir y de desviarse de los encantos y de las promesas del populismo fascista que, en el siglo XXI, no dejó de rondar a todos. Palabras clave: Narrativas Radiofónicas; Experiencia; Walter Benjamin Data de registro: 07/03/2023 Data de aceite: 22/11/2023. (shrink)

How should we understand the emotional rationality? This first part will explore two models of cognition and analogy strategies, test their intuition about the emotional desire. I distinguish between subjective and objective desire, then presents with a feeling from the "paradigm of drama" export semantics, here our emotional repertoire is acquired all the learned, and our emotions in the form of an object is fixed. It is pretty well in line with the general principles of rationality, especially the lowest reasonable (...) principles. Turned to the second part of this side of reasonable. I will inquire how emotional beliefs, desires, and behaviors contribute to the rationality. I will present a very general biological hypothesis: emotions by controlling highlights the characteristics of perception and reasoning, so that we remove the difficulties due in particular to lead to paralysis; they are being simulated by a simplified perception of information, thus limiting our practice and cognitive choice. How are we to understand emotional or axiological rationality? I pursue analogies with both the cognitive and the strategic models, testing them against intuitions about emotional desires. We distinguish two different classes of desires, the subjective and the objective, and propose that emotions have a semantics that derives from "paradigmatic scenarios", in terms of which our emotional repertoire is learned and the formal objects of our emotions fixed. This fits in well with emerging facts about how our emotional capacities develop, and it can also be squared with the general principles of rationality, particularly minimal rationality. In the second part, I return to the perspective of rationality. I ask how emotions contribute to the rationality of beliefs, desires, and behavior. I proffer a very general biological hypothesis: Emotions spare us the paralysis potentially induced by a particular predicament by controlling the salience of features of perception and reasoning; they temporarily mimic the informational encapsulation of perception and so circumscribe our practical and cognitive options. (shrink)

This article examines the evaluative nature of the folk concepts of weakness and strength of will and hypothesizes that their evaluative nature is strongly connected to the folk concepts of blame and credit. We probed how people apply the concepts of weakness and strength of will to prototypical and non-prototypical scenarios. While regarding prototypical scenarios the great majority applied these concepts according to the predictions following from traditional philosophical analyses. When presented with non-prototypical scenarios, people were divided. Some, against traditional (...) analyses, did not apply these concepts, which we explain in terms of a clash of evaluations involving different sorts of blame and credit. Others applied them according to traditional analyses, which we explain in terms of a disposition to be reflective and clearly set apart the different sorts of blame and credit involved. Still others applied them in an inverse way, seemingly bypassing the traditional components resolution and be.. (shrink)

Representationalism—the view that scientific modeling is best understood in representational terms—is the received view in contemporary philosophy of science. Contributions to this literature have focused on a number of puzzles concerning the nature of representation and the epistemic role of misrepresentation, without considering whether these puzzles are the product of an inadequate analytical framework. The goal of this paper is to suggest that this possibility should be taken seriously. The argument has two parts, employing the “can’t have” and “don’t need” (...) tactics drawn from philosophy of mind. On the one hand, I propose that representationalism doesn’t work: different ways to flesh out representationalism create a tension between its ontological and epistemological components and thereby undermine the view. On the other hand, I propose that representationalism is not needed in the first place—a position I articulate based on a pragmatic stance on the success of scientific research and on the feasibility of alternative philosophical frameworks. I conclude that representationalism is untenable and unnecessary, a philosophical dead end. A new way of thinking is called for if we are to make progress in our understanding of scientific modeling. (shrink)

Ira Brevis furor, said the Latins: anger is a brief bout of madness. There is a long tradition that views all emotions as threats to rationality. The crime passionnel belongs to that tradition: in law it is a kind of “brief-insanity defence.” We still say that “passion blinds us;” and in common parlance to be philosophical about life's trials is to be decently unemotional about them. Indeed many philosophers have espoused this view, demanding that Reason conquer Passion. Others — from (...) Hume to the Emotivists — have appeared to reverse this hierarchy.” But those philosophers who refuse to join in the general denigration of emotion as irrational usually share the presupposition that the role of rationality is limited to the calculation of means. In so far as emotions are concerned with the determination of ends, they remain, on this view, beyond the pale of rationality. Modern decision theorists have worked out schemes to assess the rationality of desires, as well as actions, against the background of beliefs and other desires.1 But these schemes leave no room at all for emotions, except, by implication, as disrupters of the rational process. (shrink)

Abstract: In a previous article in this journal, Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, Kevin Haley, Serena Eng and Daniel Fessler report data that, according to them, foster scepticism about an association between harm and morality existent in the Turiel tradition ( Kelly et al. , 2007 ). This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence (...) coming from a partial replication of their research. (shrink)

This paper concerns a recently discovered, puzzling asymmetry in judgments of whether an action is intentional or not (Knobe, Philosophical Psychology 16:309–324, 2003a ; Analysis 63:190–193, b ). We report new data replicating the asymmetry in the context of scenarios wherein an agent achieves an amoral or immoral goal due to luck. Participants’ justifications of their judgments of the intentionality of the agent’s action indicate that two distinct folk concepts of intentional action played a role in their judgments. When viewed (...) from this perspective, the puzzle disappears, although the asymmetry remains. (shrink)

This article has two purposes. First, it aims to put the development of the World Social Forum within a broad theoretical and historical context. Specifically, my goal is to understand the WSF in relation to the crises of left thinking and practice of the last thirty or forty years. Second, it offers an analysis of some recent debates about the future of the WSF. It raises questions concerning its organizational makeup and asks whether it should continue as it is, or (...) rather give way to other kinds of initiatives and struggles. Against critics such as Walden Bello, I argue that the WSF should continue and, given certain organizational changes, will contribute to the theory and practice of left movements throughout the world in the twenty-first century. (shrink)

A persistent criticism of radical embodied cognitive science is that it will be impossible to explain “real cognition” without invoking mental representations. This paper provides an account of explicit, real-time thinking of the kind we engage in when we imagine counter-factual situations, remember the past, and plan for the future. We first present a very general non-representational account of explicit thinking, based on pragmatist philosophy of science. We then present a more detailed instantiation of this general account drawing on nonlinear (...) dynamics and ecological psychology. (shrink)

For decades now a research question has firmly established itself as a staple of psychological and neuroscientific investigations on language, namely the question of whether and how bilingualism is cognitively beneficial, detrimental or neutral. As more and more studies appear every year, it seems as though the research question itself is firmly grounded and can be answered if only we use the right experimental manipulations and subject the data to the right analysis methods and interpretive lens. In this paper we (...) propose that, rather than merely improving prior methods in the pursuit of evidence in one direction or another, we would do well to carefully consider whether the research question itself is as firmly grounded as it might appear to be. We identify two bodies of research that suggest the research question to be highly problematic. In particular, drawing from work in sociolinguistics and in embodied cognitive science, we argue that the research question of whether bilingualism is cognitively advantageous or not is based on problematic assumptions about language and cognition. Once these assumptions are addressed head on, a straightforward answer to the question arises, but the question itself comes to seem to be a poor starting point for research. After examining why this is so, we conclude by exploring some implications for future research. (shrink)

The movement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) research from universities to big corporations has had a significant impact on the development of the field. In the past, AI research was primarily conducted in academic institutions, which foster a culture of peer reviewing and collaboration to enhance quality improvements. The growing interest in AI among corporations, especially regarding Machine Learning (ML) technology, has shifted the focus of research from quality to quantity. Corporations have the resources to invest in large-scale ML projects and (...) they are often more interested in fast results than in ensuring that AI algorithms are reliable and safe. This paper proposes that the description of a Darwinian process made by the mathematician and physicist Freeman Dyson can be used to understand the implications of ML research scenario. The context of the Darwinian process—or lack thereof—can be used to draw a parallel between historical and current implications of technology expansion strongly driven by economic interests, making clear the consequences of shifting AI research from academia to industry. Finally, this paper indicates future directions for AI research to create a healthier environment for the evolution of ML technology. (shrink)

Are the theoretical frameworks of phenomenology and of science compatible? And, if so, what would a reconciliation entail for science as it is practiced? Gallagher [2019] poses these two questions, answering the first in the affirmative and leaving the second unaddressed. I argue that treating the two as separate questions presupposes an inadequate distinction between theory and practice that Gallagher’s non-reductive framework motivates rejecting. Recognizing the intertwining of theory and practice allows us to answer Gallagher’s two questions about phenomenology and (...) science all at once, but it also motivates a less conciliatory conclusion than the one he offers. (shrink)

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...) the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend. (shrink)

Experimental results in reference to Brazilian children and adults are presented in the context of current discussions about essentialism and folkbiology. Using an adoption paradigm, we replicate the basic findings of a previous article in this journal concerning the early emergence in children of a birth-parent bias. This cognitive bias supports the claim that causal essentialism cross-culturally constrains the reasoning about the origin, development and maintenance of the characteristics and identity of living kinds. We also report some intriguing differences with (...) earlier findings that speak to theoretical and methodological issues of cultural relativity. (shrink)

In this essay, I will focus on the two main objections that have been adduced against the moral acceptability of contempt: the fact that it embraces a whole person and not merely some deed or aspect of a person’s character, and the way that when addressed to a person in this way, it amounts to a denial of the very personhood of its target.

Emotion Review, Volume 14, Issue 4, Page 257-261, October 2022. Müller argues that the perceptual or “Axiological Receptivity” model of emotions is incoherent, because it requires an emotion to apprehend and respond to its formal object at the same time. He defends a contrasting view of emotions as “Position-Takings" towards “formal objects”, aspects of an emotion's target pertinent to the subject's concerns. I first cast doubt on the cogency of Müller's attack on AR as begging questions about the temporal characteristics (...) of perceptual events. I then argue that Müller's version of PT is not radical enough. On my attitudinal view, formal objects are not values but natural properties that justify specific affective or behavioral responses. Values are constituted only by a negotiated social aggregation of individual evaluative attitudes. (shrink)

Os pressupostos teóricos de Ilya Prigogine e a epistemologia crítica – um diálogo de convergências? Resumo: Ter clareza das raízes epistemológicas dos referenciais teóricos utilizados nas pesquisas científicas é primordial para que essas investigações tenham veracidade. Entretanto, alguns autores, por diversos motivos, não explicitam tais informações em suas obras. Surge então a necessidade de se saber onde Ilya Prigogine - físico-químico e filósofo que refletiu sobre a função do tempo, do conhecimento e das leis fundamentais que governam o universo - (...) está epistemologicamente posicionado. Desta forma, a presente investigação buscou analisar, comparar e conectar as perspectivas da epistemologia crítica, uma das mais importantes vertentes da filosofia contemporânea, com as proposições teóricas de Prigogine, buscando encontrar conexões entre elas. Desta pesquisa exploratória de cunho bibliográfico, emergiram da análise de conteúdo as seguintes categorias: conhecimento, história, natureza, utilização e ciências exatas x humanas. Subsidiados pelas discussões aqui construídas, conseguimos constatar que existem intensas convergências entre a epistemologia crítica e a obra de Prigogine. Com isso, confirmamos que o entrelaçamento entre Prigogine e a epistemologia crítica é forte o suficiente para posicioná-lo como epistemólogo com vertente crítica. O arcabouço teórico aqui desenvolvido pode ser utilizado para justificar a utilização das ideias prigoginianas em trabalhos de orientação progressista e também abre espaço para novas pesquisas sobre o posicionamento epistemológico de Prigogine. Palavras-chave: Progressismo; Teoria Crítica; Relações histórico-sociais; Ciência; Natureza. Ilya Prigogine's theoretical assumptions and critical epistemology - a convergence dialogue? Abstract: Having clarity on the epistemological roots of the theoretical frameworks used in scientific research is paramount for these investigations to be true. However, some authors, for various reasons, do not explain the information in their works. The need then arises to know where Ilya Prigogine - physicist-chemist and philosopher who reflected on a function of time, knowledge and the fundamental principles that govern the universe - is epistemologically positioned. In this way, the present research sought to analyze, compare and connect with the perspectives of critical epistemology, one of the most important aspects of contemporary philosophy, with Progogine's theoretical proposals, seeking to find connections between them. From this exploratory research of a bibliographic nature, content analysis emerged as the following categories: knowledge, history, nature, use and exact x human. Supported by the discussions built here, he was able to verify that there are intense convergences between a critical epistemology and a work by Prigogine. With this, we confirm that the intertwining between Prigogine and a critical epistemology is strong or sufficient to position him as an epistemologist with critical criticism. The theoretical framework developed here can be used to justify the use of Prigoginian ideas in works of progressive orientation and also opens space for new research on Prigogine's epistemological positioning. Key-words: Progressiveness; Critical Theory; Historical-Social Relations; Science; Nature. Los supuestos teóricos y la epistemología crítica de Ilya Prigogine: ¿un diálogo de convergência? Resumen: Tener claridad sobre las raíces epistemológicas de los marcos teóricos utilizados en la investigación científica es fundamental para que estas investigaciones sean ciertas. Sin embargo, algunos autores, por diversas razones, no hacen explícita esta información en sus trabajos. Entonces surge la necesidad de saber dónde está posicionado epistemológicamente Ilya Prigogine, físico-químico y filósofo que reflexionó sobre una función del tiempo, el conocimiento y los principios fundamentales que gobiernan el universo. De esta forma, la presente investigación buscó analizar, comparar y conectar con las perspectivas de la epistemología crítica, uno de los aspectos más importantes de la filosofía contemporánea, con las propuestas teóricas de Progogine, buscando encontrar conexiones entre ellas. En esta investigación exploratoria de naturaleza bibliográfica, surgieron las siguientes categorías del análisis de contenido: conocimiento, historia, naturaleza, uso y ciencias humanas exactas. Subsidiado por las discusiones construidas aquí, pudo verificar que hay intensas convergencias entre una epistemología crítica y un trabajo de Prigogine. Con eso, confirmamos que el entrelazamiento entre Prigogine y una epistemología crítica es fuerte o suficiente para posicionarlo como un epistemólogo con crítica crítica. El marco teórico desarrollado aquí puede usarse para justificar el uso de ideas de Prigoginian en trabajos de orientación progresiva y también abre espacio para nuevas investigaciones sobre el posicionamiento epistemológico de Prigogine. Mots-clés: Progresismo ; Teoría Crítica ; Relaciones históricas ; Ciencia ; Naturaleza. Data de registro: 13/04/2020 Data de aceite: 22/09/2021. (shrink)

Servant leadership has been theorized as a model where the moral virtue of humility co-exists with action-driven behavior. This article provides an empirical study that tests how these two apparently paradoxical aspects of servant leadership interact in generating follower engagement, while considering the hierarchical power of the leader as a contingency variable. Through a three-way moderation model, a study was conducted based on a sample of 232 people working in a diverse range of companies. The first finding is that humble (...) leaders showed the highest impact on follower engagement regardless of their hierarchical position. Less humble leaders in lower hierarchical positions seem to be able to compensate for that through a strong action-oriented leadership style. Most notably for leaders in high hierarchical positions, the moral virtue of humility seems to strengthen the impact of their action-oriented leadership the most. These findings provide empirical support and a better understanding of the interplay between the moral virtue of humility and the action-oriented behaviors of servant leadership. (shrink)